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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
part which may be construed as making Section 524-a referable to
the procedure prescribed in Section 751, the provision for cure is
inapplicable.119 And the court further pointed out (2) that under
Section 524-a, the express relation to the correction of eriors in
a case is confined to those instances where appeal is perfected by
service of notice of appeal, whereas Section 751 expressly provides
for effectuation of appeal by filing and, service of an affidavit of
errors.
VI. DECEDENT ESTATEgS
T esfamentary Capacity
At common law, communications made by a patient to his
physician for the purpose of receiving medical aid, even though
made in the strictest confidence, were not privileged.' Conse-
quently in 1828 the Legislature enacted what is now Section 352
of the Civil Practice Act, which created a privilege between phy-
sician and patient. This section provides, "a person duly author-
ized to practice physic or surgery, or dentistry, or a registered
professional or licensed practical nurse, shall not be allowed to
disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient
in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity . . ."
Courts construed this statute so as to preclude a physician
from testifying even as to knowledge gained from observation
of his patient's appearance during the period of attendance.2
However a doctor could testify concerning the condition of a
person where he did not attend him professionally. 3
Judge Earl in Renihan v. Dennin,4 commented on this con-
struction and said "It is probably true that the statute, as we feel
obligated to construe it, will work considerable mischief. In
testamentary cases, where the contest relates to the competency
of the testator it will exclude evidence of physicians, which is
generally the most important and decisive . . . But the remedy is
with the Legislature and not with the courts." Judge Earl later
119. See People v. Cornell, 186 Misc. 825, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 835 (Delaware County
Ct. 1946).
1. Dutchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 613 (1776) ; Edington v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 569 (1879).
2. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185 (1876) ; Grattan v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281 (1880) ; Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E.
320 (1886).
3. Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564 (1879).
4. 103 N. Y. 573. 580. 9 N. E. 320. 322 (1886).
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advanced the view that the privilege should not prohibit a phy-
sician from testifying at least as to those observations which a
lay person might testify to.'
To obviate these difficulties the Legislature in 1891 enacted
what is now Section 354 of the Civil Practice Act which provides
for a complete waiver by the patient and partial waiver by the
patient's representatives where he is deceased.8  Where the repre-
sentative7 of the decedent waives the privilege the statute provides
that the "physician or surgeon may . . . disclose any information
as to the mental or physical condition of a patient who is deceased
which he acquired in attending such patient professionally, except
confidential commwnications and such facts' as would tend to di.-
grace the memory of the patient." [Emphasis added.]
This was the state of the law when the case of In re Codding-
ton's Will,8 reached the Court of Appeals. Here the testamentary
capacity of the testatrix was in dispute. An objection was inter-
posed when the physician of testatrix was asked about her mental
condition. This put in issue the meaning of "confidential com-
munications" as expressed in Section 354. The court relied on
In re Cashman's Will,' and held that the Legislature intended to
adopt the suggestion of Judge Earl in the Eddington,0 Grattan"1
and Re-ihan2 cases, viz., that physicians be permitted to testify
in such cases of limited waiver only to what they could have
noticed as laymen.' 3
Since the physician is the one person who can best tell the
condition of the patient it would seem that the construction of
the court restricts the scope of the statute unnecessarily and ren-
ders it practically worthless. In addition it seems unlikely that
the Legislature intended to put a more stringent restriction on
the testimony of a physician than that of a layman, yet this is its
5. Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564, 571 (1879).
6. Mulligan v. Sinski, 156 App. Div. 35, 38, 140 N. Y. Supp. 835, 838 (2d Dep't
1913), aff'd, 214 N. Y. 678, 108 N. E. 1101 (1915). "The power of a personal repre-
sentative . . . is not as broad as that of the patient himself."
7. C. P. A. § 354, allows waiver on trial ". . . if the validity of the last will and
testament of such deceased patient is in question, by the executor or executors named in
said will, or the surviving husband, widow or any heir at law or any of the next of
kin, of such deceased, or any other party in interest."
8. 307 N. Y. 181, 120 N. E. 2d 777 (1954).
9. 159 Misc. 881, 289 N. Y. Supp. 328 (Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd, without opinion 250
App. Div. 871, 297 N. Y. Supp. 150, (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd without opinion, 280 N. Y.
681, 21 N. E. 2d 193 (1939).
10. Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185 (1876).
11. Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281 (1880).
12. Renilan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E. 320 (1886).
13. But cf. Holcomb v. Harris, 166 N. Y. 257, 59 N. E. 820 (1901) ; Murry v.
Physical Culture Hotel, 258 App. Div. 334, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 862 (4th Dep't 1939) ; Matter
of Cleveland's W~ill, 273 App. Div. 623, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 897 (3rd Dep't 1948).
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effect, i. e., not only is he restricted to matters which a layman
could observe but in addition he may not give any testimony which
would tend to disgrace the memory of the patient.14
Estate Tax
a. Effect of taxes on elective sutre: A widow electing to
take against the will of her deceased husband is granted her
share of the estate as in intestacy, "but shall in no event be
entitled to take more than one half of the net estate of the decedent
after the deduction of . . .any estate tax."' 5  [Emphasis added.]
If the testator makes no provision for the payment of estate
taxes, the burden of the tax is apportioned among the beneficiaries
and "any exemption or deduction allowed under the law imposing
the tax by reason of the relation of any person to the decedent
. . .shall inure to the benefit of the person bearing such relation-
ship.""' Thus, to the extent of the state and federal marital
deductions, 7 a widow is to be unaffected by taxes on the estate.
The conflict with the election statute which, literally read,
imposes a tax burden on an electing widow by requiring deduc-
tion of taxes on the estate as a whole before calculating the
maximum elective share, was recently resolved by allowing the
apportionment statute to control."8 As the widow's share added
nothing to the total tax burden, the maximum limitation was
calculated before deducting any estate taxes. 9
The court held that the statutes must be read together, and
since the purpose of each is to increase the share of a surviving
spouse, 0 they must be so interpreted. Therefore "any estate
tax" refers to the tax allocable to the widow's share.2'
The dissent insists that only the Legislature can make "before
taxes" mean "after taxes. .
14. See dissent of Judge Van Voorhis in instant case.
15. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18(1) (a).
16. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §124(3).
17. TAX LAW § 249-s (4) (a); INT. REV. CODE § 812(e).
18. In re Wolf's Estate, 307 N. Y. 280, 121 N. E. 2d 224 (1954) ; noted in Appel-
late Division stage, 3 BFLO. L. REV. 328 (1954).
19. This also has the effect of reducing the total tax burden on the estate.
20. See Matter of Byrne's Will, 260 N. Y. 465, 472, 184 N. E. 56, 58 (1933) (rela-
tive to section 18); COMBINED REPORTS OF COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DEFECTS IN
THE LAW OF ESTATES, 1928-1933, 338 (Reprint ed.) (relative to section 124).
21. Where the apportionment statute is not applicable, (as where the testator pro-
vides that taxes be paid from the residuary estate), the maximum limitation is calculated
after the deduction of taxes. In re Ryan's Will, 280 App. Div. 410, 114 N.Y. S. 2d 1
(lst Dep't 1952). (Cited with approval in the instant case.)
